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Abstract 
 
Purpose of the study is to determine the range of 
ideological apparatuses used by the Russian state, 
the applied set of methods of ideological 
influence, as well as the features and causes of the 
ideological orientation of the ruling elite. The 
work analyses such ideological apparatus of the 
state as the mass media (newspapers, magazines, 
TV and radio channels); educational institutions 
(schools, state educational institutions of higher 
and secondary vocational education); political 
parties, public associations, trade unions; film 
industry (producing and distributing television 
and film), as well as people of art (filmmakers, 
writers, artists); church; press and PR services. 
The features of their relationship with the ruling 
establishment and the type and content of the 
used ideological influence are determined. For 
example, the majority of the media belongs to the 
media holdings, which in turn are controlled by 
the economic and political establishment (the 
state). In addition, there are examples of 
ideological influence in textbooks, films, public 
actions. It also briefly describes the "trolling" 
   
Аннотация 
 
Цель статьи ‒ изучить особенности 
идеологического механизма современного 
российского государства. Проанализированы 
такие идеологические аппараты государства 
как средства массовой информации (газеты, 
журналы, теле- и радио-каналы); учебные 
заведения (школы, государственные 
образовательные учреждения высшего и 
среднего профессионального образования); 
политические партии, общественные 
объединения, профессиональные союзы; 
организации киноиндустрии (производящие 
и распространяющие теле- и кинофильмы), а 
также деятели искусств (кинорежиссеры, 
писатели, художники); церковь; пресс- и PR-
службы, информационные отделы 
государственных органов, использующие 
Интернет для достижения целей пропаганды, 
а также специально созданные 
«троллинговые» организации. Определены 
особенности их взаимоотношений с 
правящей элитой, тип и содержание 
используемого идеологического воздействия. 
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organizations ("troll factories"), whose activities 
are aimed at the consciousness of the Internet 
users. The ruling establishment actively and 
effectively uses all the possibilities of the 
ideological apparatus in their class interests. The 
reason for the lack of a clear and non-vague 
ideology (like the Soviet one) is, first, the social 
heterogeneity of the ruling establishment, which 
also gives rise to different ideological positions, 
and, second, the opposite situation would only 
aggravate the legitimacy crisis of the existing 
political regime. None of the worldview models 
of the modern ideological spectrum is able to 
ensure the legitimacy of the ruling establishment, 
on the one hand, and to eliminate the 
discrepancies between the declared and social 
practices, on the other hand. 
 
Keywords: Ideology, ideological mechanism, 
ideological apparatus of the state, the ruling elite. 
 
 
К примеру, большинство средств массовой 
информации принадлежит медахолдингам, 
которые в свою очередь подконтрольны 
экономической и политической элите 
(государству). Или же между Русской 
православной церковью и правящей элитой, 
по-всей видимости, заключено некое 
соглашение: в обмен на налоговые 
преференции и субсидии церковь идейно 
обслуживает интересы элиты. Помимо 
указанного приведены примеры 
идеологического воздействия в учебниках, 
кинофильмах и при помощи публичных 
действий. Также кратко описана 
деятельность «троллинговые» организации 
(«фабрики троллей»), чья деятельность 
направлена на сознание интренет-
пользователей. На основе проведенного 
исследования сделаны несколько выводов: 
властвующая элита активно и эффективно 
использует все возможности 
идеологического аппарата в своих классовых 
интересах; причина отсутствия четкой и не 
расплывчатой идеологии (по типу советской), 
во-первых, в социальной неоднородности 
правящей элиты, что также порождает 
несовпадающие идеологические позиции, а, 
во-вторых, обратное только усугубило бы 
кризис легитимности существующего 
политического режима, ведь ни одна из 
мировоззренческих моделей современного 
идеологического спектра не в состоянии, с 
одной стороны, обеспечить легитимность 
правящей элиты, а с другой ‒ устранить 
рассогласования между декларируемым и 
социальной практикой. 
 
Ключевые слова: идеология, 
идеологический механизм, идеологические 
аппараты государства, правящая элита. 
 
Resumen 
 
El objetivo del estudio es determinar la gama de aparatos ideológicos utilizados por el estado ruso, el 
conjunto de métodos de influencia ideológica aplicados, así como las características y causas de la 
orientación ideológica de la élite gobernante. El trabajo analiza aparatos ideológicos del estado como los 
medios de comunicación (periódicos, revistas, canales de televisión y radio); instituciones educativas 
(escuelas, instituciones educativas estatales de educación profesional superior y secundaria); partidos 
políticos, asociaciones públicas, sindicatos; industria cinematográfica (producción y distribución de 
televisión y cine), así como personas de arte (cineastas, escritores, artistas); Iglesia; Servicios de prensa y 
relaciones públicas. Se determinan las características de su relación con el establecimiento gobernante y el 
tipo y contenido de la influencia ideológica utilizada. Por ejemplo, la mayoría de los medios pertenecen a 
los medios de comunicación, que a su vez están controlados por el establecimiento económico y político 
(el estado). Además, hay ejemplos de influencia ideológica en libros de texto, películas, acciones públicas. 
También describe brevemente las organizaciones de "trolling" ("fábricas de trolls"), cuyas actividades están 
dirigidas a la conciencia de los usuarios de Internet. El establecimiento gobernante utiliza activa y 
efectivamente todas las posibilidades del aparato ideológico en sus intereses de clase. La razón de la falta 
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de una ideología clara y no vaga (como la soviética) es, en primer lugar, la heterogeneidad social del 
establecimiento gobernante, que también da lugar a diferentes posiciones ideológicas, y, en segundo lugar, 
la situación opuesta solo agravaría La crisis de legitimidad del régimen político existente. Ninguno de los 
modelos de visión del mundo del espectro ideológico moderno es capaz de garantizar la legitimidad del 
establecimiento gobernante, por un lado, y eliminar las discrepancias entre las prácticas declaradas y 
sociales, por otro lado. 
 
Palabras clave: Ideología, mecanismo ideológico, aparato ideológico del estado, la élite gobernante. 
 
 
Introduction 
Due to the change in the socio-economic 
structure in the Russian Federation about 30 
years ago and the constitutional legal prohibition 
of the state and mandatory ideology, currently, 
there is a widespread opinion (in the scientific 
community as well) about the absence or 
inferiority of the state (national) ideology and the 
ideological mechanism of the modern Russian 
state. As a result, it is possible to hear calls for 
the development of a national ideology, 
including from the highest-level state leaders 
(Minin, 2013), as well as the exact opposite – the 
national ideology has already been formed and 
nothing requires to be developed (for example, 
Messages of the President of the Russian 
Federation (Message of the President of the 
Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly, 
1999; Message of the President of the Russian 
Federation to the Federal Assembly, 2000; 
Message of the President of the Russian 
Federation to the Federal Assembly, 2013). 
Without deepening into political and social 
reasons for such ambivalence, the following can 
be pointed out. First, this most likely reveals the 
ideological crisis of the ruling establishment, 
which cannot find a justification for the 
legitimacy of the existing political regime. 
Second, this gives rise to a very cautious attitude 
to the research of this topic, presuming its 
ideological and political engagement (in some 
cases this is true) and scientific frivolity. 
 
As a result, the study of the ideological 
mechanism of the Russian state did not develop 
into a scientific research trend of sociology, 
political science, and public administration. We 
do not think that this topic is not being studied at 
all, but the consistency and degree of scientific 
elaboration in comparison with other problems of 
modern social science is unsatisfying. 
 
In this regard, this work is an attempt to analyze, 
generalize and systematize the works devoted to 
the study of the elements of the state’s 
ideological apparatus and a set of methods of 
ideological influence used by the ruling Russian 
elite. This generalization, as it seems to the 
authors, will make it possible to determine the 
features and causes of the ideological orientation 
of the modern ruling elite of the Russian 
Federation. 
 
In foreign science, the study of the ideological 
mechanism of the state was associated with neo-
Marxism. In particular,  
 
L. Althusser in his most famous work "Ideology 
and Ideological State Apparatuses" (Althusser, 
2011) identified two types of state apparatus: 
repressive and ideological (ISA). He attributed to 
the latter several of its types: the religious ISA, 
the school ISA, the family ISA, etc. 
 
However, to a greater extent, foreign research 
interest was focused on the study of the 
relationship between ideology and social 
structure. Often, the ideological mechanism of 
the state in foreign countries was investigated to 
the extent that it concerned the ruling 
establishment and its use of ideology in the 
course of social interaction. For example, it was 
stated that the ruling classes sought to create 
ideologies that justified their power over the 
working people, and thus facilitated the 
management process. Even ideologies 
advocating "human relations" – friendly relations 
with workers, the need to consider their 
complaints, improve working conditions – 
essentially express a veiled desire to win their 
support in order to increase productivity and 
strengthen the power over them (Bendix, 1974). 
In addition, the works of Mannheim K. (1994), 
Merton R.K. (1992a; 1992b; Kozyrev, et al. 
2016) and Bourdieu P. (2018; 1985) can be 
mentioned as examples. 
 
In Russian science, one can conditionally 
identify two areas of study of the ideological 
sphere and the ideological mechanism of the 
state. The first aims to develop any functionally 
loaded ideological concept, designated as 
national (or state) ideology, which should be able 
to solve many social problems of Russian reality 
Vol. 8 Núm. 23 /Noviembre - diciembre 2019                                    
 
                                                                                                                                           
 
321 
Encuentre este artículo en http://www.udla.edu.co/revistas/index.php/amazonia -investiga o www.amazoniainvestiga.info                
ISSN 2322- 6307 
in general and government in particular (Volkov, 
2000; Zinoviev, 2003; Kuznetsov, 2005). 
 
Within this direction, it is also worth considering 
the study of scientists who criticize modern 
Russian ideology, which is used in the process of 
public administration, reproaching it with the fact 
that it prevents effective public administration 
and the acquisition of legitimacy of state power 
(Kulakova, & Kuznetsov, 2014). 
 
Regarding the second direction, there are the 
works of scientists and publicists who consider 
ideology as an instrument of political struggle 
and state enforcement. Here, efforts are focused 
on disavowing of political subject texts (leaders 
of parties, groups and movements; persons 
holding public office, etc.), analyzing the 
suggestive and constructive properties of 
ideology, as well as identifying contradictions 
between state ideological practices and the 
current state of the spiritual sphere of Russian 
society (Kara-Murza, 2007; Martyanov, 2007; 
Martyanov, et al. 2016; Martyanov, 2005). 
 
Studies devoted to the ideological mechanism of 
the Russian state are relatively rare. In this 
regard, the work ''The scientific theory of 
ideology and the concept of the ideological 
apparatus of the state'' by S.N. Nekrasov can be 
noted (Nekrasov, 2017). However, this study did 
not go beyond the theoretical review and did not 
receive a detailed elaboration. 
 
Methods 
 
The research method is based on the following 
provisions. 
 
First, any social group that seizes state power 
(even if it comes as a result of legitimate 
elections) seeks to impose its ideology on the 
others, using all the possibilities of the state 
mechanism. Legal, political, economic, and other 
restrictions do not eliminate this trend, but only 
drive it into a certain framework or (and) change 
the forms of manifestation. 
 
Second, the achievement of absolute success, 
when the entire population of the country or the 
overwhelming majority of it shares the ideology 
of the ruling establishment in the long term, is 
impossible. The reverse can take place (with a 
number of reservations) only in relatively short 
periods of history with a low level of social 
stratification, developed as a result of large-scale 
events (civil war, collectivization, 
industrialization, etc.). 
As a result, the contradiction between the 
imposed official ideology (used during state 
management) and the current state of the spiritual 
sphere of the citizens cannot be eliminated, just 
as social differentiation cannot be eliminated. 
These contradictions can only be smoothed. 
 
In this regard, the main hypothesis of the study is 
that it is completely senseless to seek out some 
flaws in the official ideology that supposedly 
interfere with the normal functioning of the 
mechanism of the state. Any ideology can be 
used in the interests of the ruling establishment 
to an extent that circumstances permit. One can 
only raise the question of how effectively the 
ideological mechanism is used to protect class 
interests. This is the angle from which the 
features of the ideological mechanism of modern 
Russia state will be considered. 
 
Results and discussion 
 
The ideological mechanism of the state in this 
work is understood as the ensemble of 
organizations and individuals (ISA), 
implementing ideological influence on human 
behavior, as well as methods and tools of this 
influence used in the interests of social groups 
that have seized state power. 
 
It is absolutely not necessary that the ideological 
impact is declared and fixed in legal acts as the 
goal of the organization’s functioning. For 
example, the functionality of educational 
institutions, in accordance with the Federal Law 
of Education in the Russian Federation (Federal 
Law N 273-FZ, 2012), includes the mentoring of 
students. In contrast, the purpose of the media, 
mentioned in the relevant law (RF Law N 2124-
1, 1991), is the dissemination of mass 
information. The impact exerted in this regard is 
not mentioned in this act as their goals, objectives 
or functions. 
 
Based on the developments of Althusser 
(Althusser, 2011), the elements of the ideological 
apparatus of the Russian state, described here, 
include mass media (newspapers, magazines, 
television and radio channels); educational 
institutions (schools, state educational 
institutions of higher and secondary vocational 
education); political parties, public associations, 
trade unions; film industry organizations 
(producing and distributing television and film), 
as well as people of art (filmmakers, writers, 
artists); church; press and PR services, 
information departments of state bodies using the 
Internet to achieve propaganda goals, as well as 
specially created "trolling" organizations; etc. 
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It should not be confusing that many of these 
organizations are not state-owned or even 
positioned as independent of the state. They are 
such in their functions and consequences of their 
actions. The ruling establishment through, for 
example, the economic mechanism, can lead to 
submissiveness of almost any of the 
organizations described. For particularly 
independent, one can apply legal (or not) 
violence. 
 
It should be noted that enforcement is not always 
presented. Many people support the ruling 
establishment because the state regime created 
by the latter allows them to take advantage that 
would not be available under other conditions. 
 
In particular, such a mutually beneficial 
symbiosis of the state represented by the ruling 
establishment and non-governmental 
organizations can be found in the recent history 
of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC), which 
will be discussed below. 
 
Mass media 
 
The main feature of the media market in modern 
Russia is that the majority of the media belongs 
to the media holdings, which in turn are 
controlled by the economic and political 
establishment (the state). The activities of the 
media led by the economic establishment are 
aimed at reproducing the existing political and 
social relations. Therefore, even though there are 
conflicts between them, they do not lead to 
significant social metamorphosis and, 
accordingly, can be considered as the ideological 
state apparatus (''Who owns the media in Russia: 
leading holdings'', 2014). 
 
The main method the mass media is influencing 
a person is a conviction based on a person’s 
understanding of the information received. 
However, incorrect methods from the point of 
view of rational thinking, are often used and are 
usually called methods of manipulating mass 
consciousness. They are based on infusion, on 
the uncritical perception of reality by an 
individual. 
 
The main material, which the media manipulate, 
is information, or rather, its management. The 
methods of manipulation are investigated quite 
fully (Kara-Murza, 2007; Shvidunova, 2013) and 
there is no need to repeat them. 
 
However, it should be noted that, according to a 
number of researchers, the media provide a 
relatively homogeneous communication 
environment, i.e. performing the role played by 
the church in medieval Europe (Martyanov, 
2016). At the same time, the ideological promises 
of the Russian media cannot be called identical. 
There is a very large variety in interpretations 
and representations of certain events 
(Mokhireva, 2016). Most likely, this is not due to 
the diversity of needs and tastes of the recipients, 
but to the heterogeneity of political 
establishment, the interests of different groups of 
which often contradict each other and the 
political situation. 
 
Educational institutions 
 
The ideological impact on a person is most 
effective at the stage of their socialization, 
intellectual and emotional maturation. A special 
position is occupied by primary and secondary 
schools, which are almost the first link in the 
process of educating citizens by the state. 
 
In addition, the school is a social institution, 
which cannot be excluded for the majority of the 
Russian population in the current conditions. In 
what other cases can an ideological impact on a 
person be carried out for at least four hours a day 
five times a week (excluding additional paid 
classes) for eleven years (Nekrasov, 2017)?! 
 
For the purpose of ideological influence, such 
disciplines as history, literature and social studies 
with one or another ideological ''line'' are mainly 
used. An example is a textbook on the national 
history by S.V. Alekseev, D.M. Volodikhin and 
G.A. Eliseev (Alekseev et al., 2006). The fact 
that the textbook is recommended by the 
Ministry of Education and Science of the Russian 
Federation can imply the realization of an 
ideological order by the ruling establishment (or 
its part) in this manual. S. Solovyov notes in it 
the following ideological messages. 
 
"It can be stated that the monarchical-nationalist 
version of history took a prominent place in 
school textbooks... The authors agreed on the 
appearance of the Slavic linguistic community in 
the 3rd century BC, the Slavs, in their opinion, 
were known to the ancient Greeks. Pretentious 
and very far from being scientific, the story about 
the formation of "Russian civilization" with the 
obligatory branding of its opponents – from the 
heresy of the Judaizers by Peter I ("the one that 
broke one of the walls of the Russian house"), 
Novikov, Radishchev and the Decembrists – to 
the heretic Lev Tolstoy. The events of January 9, 
1905, are depicted as "a clash of (workers) with 
troops and police," and not the shooting of a 
peaceful demonstration. In addition, the entire 
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Soviet period is called "inter-civilization gap", 
"the Red Empire, godless and devoid of healthy 
roots" (Solovyov, 2009). 
 
It should be noted that most of the other history 
textbooks turned out to be much less 
ideologically biased than the given example. 
Apparently, the monarchical-nationalist 
interpretation of history is not absolutely 
dominant among the ruling establishment. 
 
The limited nature of the mass media and 
educational institutions is that they practically do 
not involve people in mass political actions. They 
become only spectators of the political 
performance and consumers of propaganda. 
These restrictions are overcome by political 
parties, public associations, trade unions. 
 
In modern Russia, the functions of the 
ideological state apparatus are carried out by the 
political party ''United Russia'', the All-Russian 
youth public political movement ''Nashi'', the 
All-Russian social-political youth organization 
''Molodya gvardiya Edinoy Rossii'', the public 
movement ''Vserossiysky narodny front'' and 
others. 
 
These public associations prompt citizens to 
participate in governmental elections, marches, 
pickets, protests and demonstrations and other 
events. 
 
So in 2007, representatives of the ''Nashi'' held a 
six-day rally at the Estonian Embassy in 
Moscow, protesting against the decision of the 
Estonian authorities to remove the Bronze 
Soldier from the center of Tallinn (''Nashi'' tried 
to abort a press conference, 2017), and also tried 
to abort a press conference of the Estonian 
Ambassador to Russia, thereby, among other 
things, they additionally attracted the attention of 
the media. 
 
An example of an artist, particularly a filmmaker, 
who is far from having neutral ideological 
positions and as a result acting as an ideological 
agent of the state is V.I. Khotinenko. The TV-
series ''Smert Imperii'' [The Death of the Empire] 
filmed by Khotinenko (he was the director and 
one of the screenwriters) in 2005 is a technically 
professional work, but at the same time, this 
work can but be considered ideologically biased. 
The Bolsheviks, the Social Revolutionaries, and 
their supporters are presented exclusively in a 
negative light, as spies of the German general 
staff, vile, disgusting subjects, trash and boors 
(''Do not chop, man, do not chop'', 2005). In 
contrast to them, counterintelligence officers of 
the Russian Empire, and then of the Russian 
Republic, are shown only as positive heroes 
selflessly devoted to serving their homeland in its 
defense against the encroachments of internal 
and external enemies. 
 
Such a "monarchical-sovereign" line is one of the 
ideological mainstream of the ruling 
establishment, which, apparently, was adopted 
by the company "TRITE", engaged in the 
production of such films and television films . It 
should be said that he, apparently, is not 
absolutely dominant. Another film "Nezhny 
Vozrast" [Tender Age] (directed by S. 
Solovyov), produced by the same company, is 
endowed with several other ideological 
connotations. Here, there is a latent nostalgia for 
Soviet society, the disappearance of which 
immediately gives rise to meanness, selfishness, 
cruelty, hate. 
 
Church 
 
As a rule, ministers of worship of any religion 
seek to find support from the state. Otherwise, 
even having a broad social base, it does not 
organizationally extend beyond the sect with a 
very short historical period of existence. If a 
creed is a danger to the existing political regime, 
then it becomes persecuted. In most cases, 
sectarian movement can be curbed or completely 
destroyed. Some are happy to avoid such a finale, 
but only if they find themselves in some sense the 
state church with corresponding changes in the 
formula of the faith. 
 
The price of state support for the church is the 
incorporation into the mechanism of the state as 
one of the elements of the ideological apparatus. 
In modern Russia, this element is the ROC. It has 
been said a lot about the preferences granted to it 
by the state. We can mention the tax benefits: 
exemption from land tax on land with buildings 
for religious and charitable purposes; exemption 
from property tax used for religious activities; 
exemption from income tax on income received 
in connection with the performance of religious 
rites and ceremonies and from the sale of 
religious literature and religious objects. 
 
According to the RBK publishing house, in 2014, 
the income of the ROC that was not subject to 
income tax amounted to 5.6 billion rubles. In 
addition to this, according to the same 
publication, in 2012–2015, the ROC and its 
related structures received at least 14 billion 
rubles from the state budget and state 
organizations. The ROC also does not shy away 
from commercial activities. The interests of the 
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ROC include medicine, jewelry, renting 
conference rooms, as well as agriculture and the 
funeral services market (Reyter et al., 2016). 
 
The ruling establishment does not remain in debt 
and actively uses the doctrines of the ROC for 
political purposes, i.e. ideological services are 
being provided by the church to the interests of 
state power. Orthodoxy itself (naturally, in its 
respective interpretation) becomes the 
ideological basis of the state (Zhdanova, 2011). 
 
According to some researchers, the essence of 
the "Orthodox political ideology", which to some 
extent is used by the modern Russian ruling 
establishment, has the following features: 
 
1) ''Holy Russia'' and ''Orthodox people'' 
(the first is understood as the higher 
concentration of good, truth, and 
significance as a value system, as the 
spiritual dominant over the material; the 
second emphasizes the fate of Russia, 
the ''Russian civilization'', the 
Orthodox-oriented God-bearing people, 
etc.; accordingly, the ROC claims the 
leading role among other traditional 
denominations in Russia); 
2) The sovereign religious messianism, 
claims for the role of arbiter in the 
dialogue of civilizations (when the 
culturological interpretation of the term 
''civilization'' is replaced by a political 
and legal one); 
3) The use of the ''image of the enemy'' in 
the interests of strengthening the 
position of the ROC (as such, on the 
basis of the binary approach, the images 
of communists, liberals, Americans, 
sectarians, ecumenists, etc.) are used 
according to the situation; 
4) The substitution of the national by the 
Orthodox, the introduction of the 
complex of "Orthodox patriotism" 
(identification of patriotism with the 
"religion of the majority, the extension 
of the idea of "Orthodox patriotism" to 
the sphere of existence of all Orthodox 
peoples); 
5) Anti-Western attitude, a critical attitude 
towards globalization (it is argued that 
Orthodox civilization must protect its 
identity from the expansion of the 
secularized liberal West); 
6) Anti-liberalism and anti-democracy; 
7) Religious limitations in understanding 
human values, human rights, and 
freedoms; 
8) The ''symphony'' of the ROC and the 
state seems to be the ideal form of 
church-state relations (Osmachko, 
2014). 
 
With the appearance of such mass media as the 
Internet, the list of ideological devices and state 
agents should be supplemented with all kinds of 
press and PR services, information departments 
of state bodies charged with the ideological 
support of the latter in the global network. The 
created ''trolling'' organizations or organized 
groups of the Internet users are to be attributed to 
this category of the ISA. 
 
A feature of political Internet communication is 
that a user on the Internet can be a source of 
propaganda information for the majority. The 
propaganda effect is carried out according to the 
viral principle at the level of horizontal 
dissemination of information via Internet 
communication channels from user to user, in 
contrast to the classical vertical translation 
schemes of ideological content (Volodenkov, 
2016). 
 
An example of such an ideological impact is the 
activities of the Agency of Internet Research. 
The media associate the organization with the 
Russian billionaire Y.V. Prigozhin, who has the 
nickname ''Putin’s Cook'' (Yakoreva, 2017). The 
duties of the employees of the Agency of Internet 
Research include writing posts, comments on 
articles, etc. of a certain ideological orientation 
(Garmazhapova, 2013). The main topics are the 
support of the current government, criticism of 
the opposition (especially liberal), patriotism, a 
characteristic positive view of the Soviet period 
and others (Polyanskaya, 2003). 
 
Conclusion 
 
The analysis performed confirms the hypothesis 
that the ideological orientation of the ruling 
establishment is utilitarian. It is actively 
maneuvering in the ideological field, not 
disdaining an alliance with the church or Internet 
trolling. The effectiveness of this approach, in 
our opinion, in modern Russian conditions is 
very high. 
 
However, it is hardly appropriate to explain 
ideological relativism and utilitarianism solely 
by the conspiracy of the Russian ruling 
establishment. It seems that the current situation 
is influenced by the characteristics of the social 
structuring of modern Russia. 
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First, the establishment is not socially 
homogeneous. The political sphere (and, 
accordingly, ideological) is the scene of the clash 
of various elite groups with different interests 
and nonidentical social positions. In particular, 
among the higher bureaucracy, there are ''power'', 
''financial and economic'' and ''social'' blocs 
(Kozyrev, 2017). In addition to this, one can 
single out the economic elite, which, 
undoubtedly, is connected with the political 
leadership, but is not identical to it. Under such 
conditions, ideological positions will also not 
completely coincide. 
 
Second, imposing a clear and not vague ideology 
(like the Soviet one) would only aggravate the 
crisis of the legitimacy of the existing political 
regime. None of the ideological models of the 
modern ideological spectrum is able, on the one 
hand, to ensure the legitimacy of the ruling elite, 
and, on the other, to eliminate the discrepancies 
between the declared and social practices. 
Therefore, those in power have to constantly 
maneuver ideologically, symbolically hinting at 
continuity either with the Russian Empire or with 
the USSR, using innuendo, while flirting with 
nationalism, liberalism, and social democracy. 
 
A real and public consensus about basic ideas 
and values is also possible only after a significant 
change in the social structure of modern Russia. 
However, current trends say that the social 
worlds of social classes not only do not converge 
but eventually diverge further and further, 
increasing both the social and the ideological 
distance. 
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